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Abstract

Previous research indicates that explicit surveillance should
induce subjects to attribute their performance at a task to the
surveillance; hence, such subjects should persist to a lesser extent
than subjects not exposed to such surveillance.

Two forms of explicit

surveillance were utilized: human and camera, as well as the appropriate
opposites (humannon- and camera non-surveillance). Subjects were
directed to perform a model construction task, then were unobtrusively
observed during a post-task "waiting period".

No difference in

persistence was found for type of surveillance utilized.

However, as

predicted, subjects exposed to surveillance persisted less with the
task materials than subjects not exposed.•
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1
The exclamation: "I can't do this with you watching me.1" occurs
frequently enough for almost everyone to be familiar with it.

The usual

result is for the observer to remove him/herself from the situation
leaving the task-performer to continue happily on his way.

Situations

exist, however, in which role requirements constrain a person from
expressing this feeling.

For example, in industry it is expected that

a supervisor has the right to observe the performance of a worker at
any time; in penal or psychiatric institutions staff may observe the
behaviour of inmates at any time; and in schools, teachers may assign
tasks and then observe a student's performance.
Historical Perspective
The effect of an observer on one's performance at some task,
although only recently begun to be studied within the framework of
attribution theory, has its roots in the study of social facilitation.
As early as the late nineteenth century, psychologists studied
what is now called social facilitation.

Typically a person's behaviour

on a task while working alone was compared with his behaviour at the
same task performed in the presence of others.

Such studies often found

that the performance of a subject at a task was enhanced (increased above
a stabilized level) both in the presence of an audience and in coaction
(i.e. with individuals engaged in the same task) (Allport, 1920;
Travis, 1925; Triplett, 1897).

However, Allport (1920) found that this

paradigm did not apply to more complex tasks.

Pessin (1933) demonstrated

that although an audience enhanced the performance of a subject at a well
learned task, the presence of an audience inhibited learning of new
responses.

Zajonc (1965) summarized previous studies of audience
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effects and coaction (including various types of tasks and audiences).
He concluded from the research that both coaction and the presence of
an audience enhance performance of a well learned ("dominant") response
and inhibit the learning of new responses.
One direction that has apparently been overlooked by the social
facilitation literature, is the long term effects of behaviour in the
presence of others.

That is, although social facilitation theory is

able to make predictions concerning a particular subject's performance
at a task (in the sense of whether a person will tend to perform the
task on his own initiative) at some future time;

Attribution theory

provides a basis for making such predictions.
Theoretical Considerations: Attribution Theory and Intrinsic Motivation
Attribution theory generally encompasses the study of processes
Individuals utilize in analyzing their own and others' behaviour, in an
attempt to perceive the causes of behaviour (Bern 1965, 1967, 1972; Jones
Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins and Weiner, 1971; Kelley 1967, 1973).
Broadly speaking, attribution theory attempts to explain how behaviours
are analysed in terms of factors originating in the environment, or
externally; within the person, or internally; or a combination of both
(Heider 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967, 1973).
Before attribution theory was initially formulated by Harold
Kelley In 1967, Koch (1956) noted that research in psychology tended to
focus on all human motivation in terms of extrinsic factors.

This, he

postulated, failed to take into account much of human behaviour.

He

noted the need for a new "language"; that is, terms to explain intrinsic
movitation.
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Hunt (1965) posited a model intended to explain stages in the
development of

intrinsic.motivation.

In stage one, at birth, infants

supposedly respond with attentional orientation and arousal to changes
In ongoing input through the ears and eyes: "Something heard becomes
something to look at" (p. 258). In stage two, objects, persons and
places which have become re cognitive ly familiar, become motivationally
attractive, and this motivates efforts to retain or regain perceptual
contact with the recognitively familiar: "Things should be recognizable"
(p. 258). Finally, in stage three, there is an emergence of interest in
what is novel in an otherwise recognitively familiar situation, focusing
attention on new objects and places, and on manipulation of objects and
exploration of places: "If you act you can make things happen" (p. 259).
To summarize, Hunt (1970) explained that "by intrinsic motivation I mean
that motivation which is inherent in information processing and action"
(p. 1). Hunt developed this model within a very well referenced framework of physiological and cognitive developmental studies.

He did not

however, expand on social factors which may affect intrinsic motivation.
What is of significance is that an attempt was made to formulate a
developmental model of internally generated behaviours. What was lacking,
however, was the conceptualization of perhaps other stages or factors
which would reveal some understanding of the dynamics of adult intrinsic
motivation.
At present this researcher has found no research extrapolating
from Hunt's model.

Some progress however, is being made from other

directions (notably social psychology) toward defining some of the
environmental and internal conditions affecting intrinsic motivation.
Several theorists have attempted to explain the source and nature of

intrinsic motivation in the human psychological make-up.
From one line of thought relating to intrinsic motivation,
Festinger (1954) postulated that "there exists in the human organism
a drive to evaluate his opinions and abilities.... the holding of incorrect
opinions and/or inaccurate appraisals of one's abilities can be punishing
and often fatal in many situations" (p. 117). This suggests that a drive
may exist for a person to seek causes for his own and others' behaviour.
From another line of thought, DeCharms (1968) asserted that there
is a tendency in man to "strive to be a causal agent.... to be the origin
of his behaviour" (p. 269). Hence, DeCharms suggested there is a tendency
for a person to seek to define his causal role in a situation which
demands some performance from him.

If a person perceives the locus of

causality for his behaviour to be within himself (that is, sees himself
as "actor" or "origin") he experiences intrinsic motivation, and finds the
situation or activity rewarding in itself.

If a person perceives the locus

of causality for his behaviour to be external to himself (that is, sees
himself as "pawn") he experiences extrinsic motivation.

Having some

extrinsic motivation implies that the person is involved in the activity
for the sake of some extrinsic goal, such as a reward or an avoidance of
punishment.
Heider (1958) suggested that if a person works for the sake of
some extrinsic goal, he may find the work itself "neutral or even disagreeable" (p. 126). B.F. Skinner's (1953) theory of reinforcement would
seem to suggest the opposite regarding an external goal which is positive;
that is, if a person receives some positive reinforcement for eliciting
a certain behaviour, he will have a positive attitude toward performing
that behaviour.

However, this is not necessarily so —

the person may

find the only positive or agreeable aspect of the behaviour is the
expected reinforcement.

In another sense, a person could "sacrifice"
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a behaviour.

That is, a person could perform a non-preferred behaviour

rather than a preferred behaviour for the sake of reinforcement.
Weiner (1972) noted that one quality that differentiates external
from internal determinants of behaviour is that only sources of action
attributed to the person (internal) can be labelled as "intentional".
He goes on to suggest that "differential allocation of causality between
the two factors also results in disparate affective experiences, future
expectations and behaviours" (p. 315).
Operational Definitions of Intrinsic Motivation
At this point it is necessary to elaborate on what it is that
researchers (in the area of attribution theory) refer to as intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation.

Nisbett and Valins (1973) point out that various

researchers defined intrinsic-extrinsic motivation differently.

For

example, DeCharms (1968) refers to the internal as the causal role of the
person, and the external as the causal role of the environment.

Jones

and Nisbett (1971) refer to a dispositional (intrinsic) versus situational
(extrinsic) frame of reference.

Dispositional characteristics are enduring

personality traits of an individual, whereas situational characteristics
are those which would generally elicit the same forces across different
types of personalities to behave in a similar manner.

Nisbett and Valins

(1971) refer to factors intrinsic to a given stimulus versus those
extrinsic or circumstantial.

A person reacts to the functional aspects

of a stimulus, assuming one is capable of "tunnel vision", or, on the
other hand, one views that stimulus considering circumstances connected
to that stimulus, a "wider lens vision" so to speak, giving weight to
surrounding stimuli.

For example, if a person is performing a task, with
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few distractions present he is focusing on the factors intrinsic to the
task, such as demands for performance from various parts of his body
and mind.

On the other hand, if the person is performing that same task

with another person present who is evaluating his performance, the person
tends to focus not only on factors intrinsic to the task but also the
reactions (verbal comments, facial expressions) of the evaluating person.
Kelley (1967, 1973) proposed a complex model of the factors which
an individual takes into account before concluding whether he is
intrinsically motivated toward performing some task or enjoys some
stimulus or situation.

The four vital criteria which Kelley proposed

are involved in the judgment of a stimulus are: distinctiveness (the
impression one has of a stimulus during the presence of the stimulus),
consistency over time (the same or nearly the same impression occurring
each time the stimulus is present), consistency over modality (a consistent
reaction occurring even though the mode of interaction with the stimulus
varies) and consensus (knowledge of other observer's or actors' consistent
reaction to the stimulus).
Theoretical Perspective of the Present Experiment
Considering these various frames of reference, it seems that
Nisbett and Valins' (1971) definition is most useful in terms of
experimental testing of intrinsically motivated behaviour (as described
later in this section).
DeCharms' formulation does not adequately define factors which
lead persons to conclude whether they are "origins" or "pawns". Aside
from being simplistic, it would seem to imply an improbable view of
individuals constantly striving to ascertain whether they or the world
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is causing their reaction to the stimulus.
Jones and Nisbett's frame of reference (situational versus
dispositional) does account for an understanding of some information
processing of social interactions in terms of the Actor-Observer studies.
"Different aspects of available information are salient for actors and
and observers, and this differential salience affects the course and
outcome of the attribution process" (Jones and Nisbett, 1971, p. 85).
Since the actor has much information about his own abilities, his perceived
difficulty of the task, his self-confidence, his past successes and
failures at the task, or in general at other tasks, and the observer has
little information about the actor other than the perceived performance
at the task, actor and observer obviously would process different
attributions concerning the task-oriented behaviour.

Observers tend

to make dispositional attributions concerning an actor's behaviour,
whereas actors tend to make situational attributions concerning their own
behaviour (Jones and Harris 1967; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and Ward,
1968; Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek, 1973;
and Snyder and Jones 1974).

Although these studies do not seek what

attributions actors think observers are making, it seems reasonable that
actors may intuitively understand the attribution process occurring within
observers.

Perceiving the inequity in the amount of task-relevant

information available to observers and themselves, actors may find the
presence of observers objectionable or aversive.

These studies tend

to confirm a probably very prevalent difference in attributions.

However,

little progress is made from this direction of research toward discovering how an actor might come to make dispositional attributions concerning
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his own behaviour.
Kelley proposed what seems an acceptable model for explaining the
attributional process.

However, the complexity of that model does not

readily lend itself to experimental confirmation.

Manipulation and

analysis of the relevant factors would heavily tax the resources of
a researcher, as well as involve some considerable control over individual
subjects.

For example, confirmation of the model would perhaps involve

the recording of some physiological measure (e.g. galvanic skin response
or G.S.R.) for distinctiveness of impression of a stimulus.

This measure

would have to be recorded several times to ascertain whether the
individual subject's reaction to the stimulus was consistent over time.
This would have to be recorded with the stimulus presented in several
modes: that is, the individual would have to interact with the stimulus
in several different ways.

Finally the individual would have to observe

other individuals reacting (via G.S.R.) consistently in a certain fashion
to the stimulus.

After all this, the individual should form his judgment

of the stimulus.

The model is valuable to some researchers in that

complex models often reflect more valid statements about human behaviour
than simple models do.

However, considering the disadvantages in

utilizing the model (time required to test each subject, equipment,
number of possible stimuli to choose from) the model seems impractical
for experimental testing.
The model of intrinsic-extrinsic motivation proposed by Nisbett
and Valins (1971) seems most conducive to progressive research.

Essentially

the nature of the problem (concerning intrinsic motivation) through this
model is: what are the important factors of circumstance which tend to
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enable an individual (actor) to focus on a particular stimulus or task?
Also, the problem (concerning extrinsic motivation) might be stated as:
what are the important factors of circumstance which tend to result
in an individual focusing on the stimulus plus the factors surrounding
the stimulus?
A possible answer to these questions may exist in statements from
other attribution theorists.

Bern (1965, 1967, 1972) and Kelley (1967,

1973) suggested that individuals may, in the absence of an easily discernible external basis for their behaviour, use their behaviour as evidence
of some relatively stable internal characteristic.

For example, when

no salient external reward is present for performing a behaviour,
individuals may conclude that the activity or situation is rewarding in
itself.
London and Nisbett (1974) have formulated a theory to extend this
idea:
The theory may be schematized in the following
way: (1) an internal cue (2) arouses evaluative
needs. The evaluative needs lead in turn to a
(3) process of explanation in terms of (4) an
external cue (p. 13).
If an individual's behaviour in a situation arouses evaluative needs
within that individual, and, if no external cues are readily available
for purposes of explanation then the individual may assume that his
behaviour originated from some "relatively stable internal characteristic".
Research Related to the Present Experiment
Deci (1972), Lepper and Greene (1975) and Lepper, Greene and
Nisbett (1973) have demonstrated the consequences of salient external
rewards.

Deci found that college students who were paid to engage in an

interesting activity showed a greater decrease in performance from the
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first to the third engagements than unpaid controls.

Lepper and Greene

and Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, in similar experiments found that
children who were promised a reward and rewarded for performing an
interesting activity interacted significantly less with the target

.

activity during a normal classroom session some time later than did unexpected reward and unrewarded controls.

Thus, presence of rewards may

be seen as one factor in the environment leading individuals to infer
that their performance at a task was extrinsically motivated.

This

assumes, of course, that spontaneous manipulations of similar task
materials at a future time indicates intrinsic motivation.
There is some evidence that other factors may serve as cues for
extrinsic motivation.

Deci (1972) found that threatened punishment

(for failure to solve interesting puzzles correctly) led to fewer
spontaneous manipulations of similar materials when left alone (compared
to unthreatened controls).
Lepper and Greene (1975) demonstrated that surveillance may
have the same undermining effect.

Nursery school children were informed

that they would be watched periodically through an obvious television
camera while they performed a task of solving interesting puzzles.
These children interacted significantly less with the target activity,
later, in a normal classroom session, than did children who worked at the
puzzles with the camera pointing away from them.

Lepper and Greene

manipulated high and low frequency of surveillance (surveillance during
the solving of four of the six puzzles versus surveillance during the
solving of one of the six puzzles) and found no difference.

Subjects

in both high and low surveillance conditions interacted less with the
target activity than non-surveillance subjects.
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These studies suggest that certain explicit extrinsic cues have
an effect on persistence (future behaviour) at a task.

Other studies

indicate that-the salience of extrinsic cues may be lessened or the
salience of internal cues increased with quite different effects.
Valins (1966) found that male undergraduates believing a prerecorded
sound track to be their own heart beat, tended strongly to prefer nude
photographs shown in conjunction with a change in this bogus heart rate
over others shown when the "heart rate" was "normal". Davidson and
Valins (1969) demonstrated that behaviour change was more likely to be
maintained if it was attributed to oneself than if it was attributed to
a drug.

Subjects withstood more electric shocks in a normal condition

than when the attributed their lack of ability to a skin-sensitizer
(actually a placebo) pill.

Bowers (1975), via post-hypnotic suggestions,

led subjects to self-attribute preferences for certain types of pictures
in an art judgment task.

The manipulated preference persisted during

later test trials, even when the post-hypnotic suggestions were inoperative.
Aside from the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic
attributions in terms of future behaviour, Kruglanski, Friedman and Zeevi
(1971) found differences in some qualitative aspects of task performance.
Subjects in a no-incentive as opposed to promised reward condition
exhibited superiority in creativity of performance and in task recall,
manifested a stronger Ziegarnik effect (that is, a tendency to remember
incompleted tasks) and reported greater enjoyment of the experiment.
The above mentioned studies provide evidence that certain salient
extrinsic (to the stimulus) cues may affect an individual's reaction to
a stimulus task.

The problem then arises in recognizing the presence
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of an extrinsic cue affecting intrinsic motivation.

Increased initial

performance may not be sufficient evidence of the presence of an
extrinsic cue affecting the behaviour: it is possible that intrinsic
motivation may produce the same effect. Although qualitative aspects
of task performance in conjunction with salient extrinsic (or lack of)
cues may stand further examination, the measurement of such is still not
sufficient to predict future behaviours.

It seems that persistence at

a task (spontaneous manipulation of the task materials) at a future time,
in the absence of external compliance, is at present the only observable
measure of an internally generated behaviour, or, an intrinsically
motivated behaviour.
If persistence at a task is to be a goal (in a social interaction introducing a task behaviour) it seems that extrinsic cues should
be relatively subtle or non-salient.

Examples of explicit extrinsic

cues (in previous research) affecting persistence at a task include
evidence of factors such as rewards, threats of punishment and surveillance.
Appropriate control groups, which tended to persist to a greater extent
at the tasks, were those subjected to the same procedure without the
aforementioned explicit extrinsic cues present.
Experiments testing effects of these explicit extrinsic cues tended
to involve only one observation of persistence.

Concerning the effect-

iveness of a single interaction, Kelley and Thibaut (1971) have suggested
that a brief sample of behaviour may serve chiefly to introduce attributional instability and consequent information seeking.

Perhaps the

"consequent information seeking" may involve performance at the task at
a future time, if such an opportunity should exist. The tendency to
persist at the task at a future time may be explained in these terms, and
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the future opportunity may as easily disconfirm as confirm the person's
attribution.
Valins (1974), however, suggested that consequences of this future
information-seeking behaviour may tend to be biased in the direction of
the attribution made during the previous, subtly-generated behaviour.
In Valins' (1974) experiment, male undergraduates, even after being
informed that the heart rate that led them to prefer certain photographs
over others was really a bogus heart rate, still expressed preference for
those photographs over others.
Rajala and Ross (1973) tested the hypothesis that surveillance
affects persistence, as did the Lepper and Greene (1973) study; however
the two methodologies differed.

Lepper and Greene utilized both sexes of

nursery school children as subjects, a television camera as a surveillance
technique, did not attempt to control for performance (in terms of time),
and conducted the post-experimental persistence measure two weeks later.
Rajala and Ross utilized male undergraduates as subjects and the physical
presence or absence of the experimenter as a surveillance technique.
They attempted to control for performance, and obtained the persistence
measure through immediate post-task unobtrusive observation.

Both

experiments yielded significant results; that is, subjects in the
surveillance condition tended to persist less at the target task behaviour
than subjects in the non-surveillance condition.

However, the Rajala and

Ross study yielded a substantial number of zero persistence scores for
both experimental and control groups, which precluded the possibility of
utilizing a parametric test of the results.
Although the Rajala and Ross experiment yielded significant
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results in terms of a one tailed, non-parametric test, its results were
questionable.

The result's of the Lepper and Greene study were also

questionable, this experimenter felt, in terms of whether nursery
school children were able to understand the significance of the television
camera.

Perhaps the television camera meant something entirely different

to the children than the surveillance it was intended to represent.

The

Lepper and Greene experiment also presented problems in terms of control
of extraneous factors. During the post-task persistence measure,
conducted unobtrusively in a normal classroom setting, many children
were present and some of these may have interacted with the task materials
for an inordinate amount of time.

Hence, some of the children placed

under surveillance in the experiment may not have had sufficient
opportunity to interact with the puzzles during the normal classroom
session.

Since the results of both previous surveillance studies were

questionable, the present study was conducted, to provide a more direct
and meaningful test of the relationship between surveillance and persistence at a task.
The Present Experiment
This study constituted a further attempt to ascertain the
the effects of surveillance on intrinsic motivation as measured by
persistence at a task with an adult population.

The main hypothesis of

this experiment was that subjects placed under surveillance during the
task time will persist to a lesser extent during a post task free-time
period than subjects not placed under surveillance during the task time.
The presence of surveillance, as attribution theory suggests, should
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lead subjects to attribute their performance at the task at least to some
extent to the presence of the surveillance.

Hence, once the surveillance

is removed, the subjects under surveillance should continue to interact
with the task materials to a lesser extent than subjects who had not been
under surveillance.
Of further interest, this experiment compared human surveillance
and camera surveillance.

This was done to elicit any possible differences

between the two types of surveillance, since both types of surveillance
are present to some extent in previously mentioned constraining
situations (e.g. industrial settings).

Also, previous research has

included both human and camera surveillance but apparently no one has
compared the two in one study.

Although it is not possible to make an

explicit hypothesis with respect to human versus camera surveillance
differences, one might expect human surveillance to have a greater impact.
That is, subjects under human surveillance should persist less than
subjects under camera surveillance.

One might speculate that human

surveillance is more salient since subjects can readily confirm that
they are being observed and can verbally interact with the observer.
With camera surveillance, subjects cannot readily confirm that they are
being observed.

That is, it is not possible to verbally interact with

the observer and it is possible that the observer may periodically be
engaged at other tasks.
For the purpose of this experiment persistence is defined as
spontaneous interaction with the task materials (tinker toys) in the
absence of external constraints such as expectations, role requirements,
etc.

The interaction as such, covered a wide variety of manners in which

the task material might be 'interacted with.

For example, a subject might
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touch only one or two pieces, manipulating them in various ways, obviously
not constructing a model as a work unit (as defined during the performance trial).

A subject might even have constructed a model then dis-

assembled it, all this time being counted as interaction with the task
materials.
The construction of tinker toy models was chosen as the task for
this experiment, because the experimenter felt that this task had certain
advantages.

First, tinker toys constitute a relatively novel task

material, not likely to have entered the particular subject group's
repertoire of behaviour for some considerable length of time, e.g. 10-15
years, since childhood.

Hence this would eliminate differences in
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performance due to differential practice effects.
material is relatively simple to manipulate.

Secondly, the task

That is, it is expected

that few people would have trouble constructing models.

Thirdly, with

this task, performance may be measured, both in number of models constructed and total number of pieces used in the models.
Since Henchy and Glass (1968) found that "threat of evaluation in
the absence of an audience can produce energizing effects upon performance
about identical to those obtained when experts are observing the
individual" (p. 452), an attempt was made, in this experiment, to control
for performance through the emphasis that the individual subject's
performance would be scored afterward.

Hopefully, this would have

produced "energizing effects" on the performance of subjects in the nonsurveillance conditions to counteract effects of social facilitation on
performance in the surveillance condition.

3

Thus, regardless of

condition, subjects believed that their performance was to be evaluated.
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A post-task questionnaire (Appendix B) attempted to elicit
qualitative differences in task performance, as perceived by the
subjects.
An attempt was also made via post-experimental questioning
(Appendix D) to ascertain the subject's awareness of the surveillance
or lack of it, and to determine what subjective effects each particular
condition produced.

Method

Subjects
Subjects who volunteered to participate in the experiment were
sixty-eight single male undergraduates, enrolled in the introductory
psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University.

Experimental participat-

ion is encouraged but not required for introductory psychology students
at W.L.U.
Procedure
Seventeen subjects were randomly assigned to each of four
conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

human surveillance present
human surveillance absent
television camera present, operative, directed at task area
television camera present, inoperative, directed away from
task area.

As each subject entered the experiment room (see Appendix A for
experimental setting), the experimenter directed him to be seated in a
chair before the table.

On the table there were a shallow box full of

tinker toy pieces (approximately four hundred pieces) and a list of
models to build.
box.

On a stand beside the table there was a large, empty

The experimenter sat in a chair to one side of the table and

instructed each subject as follows:
"What I want you to do is to simply build some models.
This is a timed task; you will have twenty minutes to work
on it, and afterwards I have a questionnaire I'd like
you to fill out. I'm interested in finding out how many
models you can build in the time allotted, as well as
how well they approximate the object. This may be
seen as sort of a trade off between quantity and
quality. I want you to start at the top of this list
of models and work your way down, building each one as
it comes up. I want you to build whatever you think
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each one looks like; they can be either two or three
dimensional. Don't skip any one if you think it's
too hard; just make something that looks like it.
As you finish each model, I want you to put it in
the box over here (indicating large, empty box),
because I've got to take the models out to score
them after the time is up. You've got twenty
minutes to work at this, but you don't have to
finish all the models within this time. Just do
what you can. I'll let you know when the time is
up. Do you have any questions?....Okay, you can
start now."
For human surveillance subjects (HS), the experimenter,

after

instructing the subject to start, sat back, noticeably activating a
stopwatch.

The experimenter watched the subject building each model

(apparently timing each model constructed) and made copious notes on
his clip board.

The experimenter briefly answered any questions asked

by the subject.
For human non-surveillance subjects (HNS), the experimenter rose after the
instructions, commenting: "I'll leave you to work at this and I'll let
you know when the time is up'." Then, after noticeably activating a stopwatch, he left the room.
For camera surveillance subjects (CS), the experimenter commented:
"I would like to observe your progress at,the task by means of this
camera".

Then, after plugging in the camera to activate it (actually a

dummy camera with an obtrusive red light activated when the camera was
plugged in), the experimenter left the room.
For camera non-surveillance subjects (CNS), (that is, the television
camera was present in the room, but not activated, and was pointed toward
a wall away from the subject) the experimenter proceeded similarly as for
the human non-surveillance condition, making no mention of the camera's
presence.
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For all conditions, after the twenty minutes of task time,
the experimenter re-entered the room (or rose, in the human surveillance
condition), and commented: "Okay, time is up".

If the subject was in

the process of building a model, the experimenter instructed him to put
what was done of it in the box with the rest of the models.
The experimenter then picked up the box of models built,
explaining: "I have to take these out to be scored and you may wait
here.

It will only take a few minutes, then I have a questionnaire I'd

like you to fill out." The experimenter then left the room, taking
the box of models and list, and proceeded to the observation room.
Before leaving, in the camera surveillance condition, the experimenter
casually unplugged the camera, commenting: "I won't need this any more".
Approximately one half minute later the experimenter began recording the subject's persistence time (using two stop watches).

The

observation of persistence time was unobtrusive, by means of a real
television camera disguised behind an intercom speaker screen in the
ceiling of the experiment room and focused on the table with the tinker
toy pieces on it.

The picture of activity on the table was projected to

a television monitor in the adjacent (observation) room.

The persistence

time measure consisted of the time spent touching tinker toy pieces within
the ten minutes immediately following the experimenter taking position
for observation.
After recording the persistence time, the experimenter returned
to the experiment room bringing the box of models and a copy of the
questionnaire.

The experimenter commented: "Here is a questionnaire

I'd like you to fill out".
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The questionnaire (see Appendix B) contained four evaluative
questions and one filler question.

The evaluative questions concerned

forced choice ratings of task interest, enjoyableness and difficulty,
and a rating of subject nervousness during the experiment.

The filler

question (#3, given simply to balance the page) concerned rating of the
task on several irrelevant dimensions; for example, good to bad.
The experimenter then left the room commenting: "I'll leave you
with that for a few minutes". One minute after the subject completed
the questionnaire (observed by means of the television monitor) the
experimenter returned.
The experimenter then asked the subject questions to determine
what the subject thought the experiment was about (see Appendix D ) .
Following this, the experimenter probed subjects with questions concerning
their awareness of their experimental condition, how it made them feel
toward the task and what effect they thought their condition had upon
their performance at the task (see Appendix E for the responses).

The

experimenter then debriefed each subject as to the real purpose of the
experiment, the deception used (as well as why it was necessary), and
revealed the observation room and its contents (see Appendix G).
Finally, the experimenter asked subjects not to reveal anything
of the experiment or experimental setting to anyone, explaining that he
would be running more subjects and that naive subjects were needed for
valid results.

The experimenter thanked each subject for taking part in

the experiment and promised feedback when the experiment was finished.
After each subject left, the experimenter counted the number of
models (unfinished models were counted as whole models), the total number
of pieces used and disassembled the models.

22
Results

Task Performance
A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance for number of models
constructed (see Table 1 for means, Table 2 for analysis of variance)
indicated no significant difference between presence or absence of
surveillance.

Type of surveillance (human versus camera) did not

significantly affect number of models constructed, nor was there a
significant interaction effect.
A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance for number of pieces used
in construction of the models (see Table 3 for means, Table 4 for analysis
of variance) also indicated no significant difference between presence
or absence of surveillance.

Type of surveillance (human versus camera)

approached significance, F (1,67) = 3.55 £ /. 06.

That is, subjects in

the human surveillance and human non-surveillance conditions tended to
use more pieces than subjects in their camera counterparts (X (human)
= 120.89 pieces, X (camera) «* 106.44 pieces).

The interaction effect

was not significant.
Persistence
A further 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance with persistence
times (see Table 5 for means, Table 6 for analysis of variance) indicated
a significant main effect for presence or absence of surveillance,
F (1.67) = 12.12 £^.001.

Subjects who had been under surveillance

persisted less (X » 2.77 minutes) than subjects who had not been under
surveillance (X « 5.42 minutes).

Type of surveillance however, was not

significantly different, nor was there a significant interaction effect.

/

s

TABLE 1

Mean Number of Models Constructed

Human

Camera

Surveillance

13.00

10.65

11.83

Non-Surveillance

10.35

10.59

10.47

Overall X

11.68

10.62

11.15

Note.

Overall X

Maximum number possible = 20.
Number of subjects in each cell = 17.

TABLE 2

Analysis of Variance:
Number of Models

Source of Variation

Sum of Squares

D.F.

Mean Square

Surv
a

31.118

1

31.118

2

TSurv.

19.059

1

19.059

1

Surv x TSurv

28.471

1

28.471

2

Residual

727.876

64

12.038

Total

808.523

67

a Surv = presence vs. absence of surveillance
b TSurv - human vs. camera surveillance
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TABLE 3

Mean Number of Pieces Used

Human

Camera

Overall X

Surveillance

129.24

107.41

118.33

Non-Surveillance

112.53

105.47

109.00

Overall X

120.89

106.44

113.88

/

TABLE 4

Analysis of Variance:
Number of Pieces

Source of Variation
Surv

a

TSurv.

Sum of Squares

D.F.
D.F.

Mean Square

1477.779

1

1477.779

1

3545.309

1

3545.309

3

926.484

1

926.484

63839.426

64

997.491

69789.000

67

1041.627

D

Surv x TSurv
Residual
Total

a Surv • presence vs. absence of surveillance
b TSurv « human vs. camera surveillance
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TABLE 5

Mean Persistence Times (Minutes)

Human

Camera

Surveillance

2.52

3.02

2.77

Non-Surveillance

5.39

5.44

5.42

Overall X

3.96

4.23

4.09

Note. Maximum time • .0 minutes

Overall X

TABLE 6

An<i l y s i s of Variance:
Persistence

Source of V a r i a t i o n

D.F.

Mean Sqi

118.880

1

118.880

1.291

1

1.291

.838

1

.838

Residual

628.029

64

9.813

Total

749.039

67

11.180

Surv

a

TSurv.
Surv x TSurv

Sum of Squares

a Surv - presence vs. absence of surveillance
b TSurv « human vs. camera surveillance

*£ ^.001

12
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To elicit any correlation between performance and persistence,
the factors of number of models, number of pieces used and persistence
time were correlated by means of Pearson correlation coefficients.
These calculations were based on all of the data, disregarding
experimental conditions.

A significant correlation was found between

number of models built and number of pieces used (r = .63, n

/.001).

Number of pieces and persistence failed to relate significantly (r =-:18);
however, number of models and persistence related significantly in a
negative direction (r =—22, p ^.05).
Since a significant negative correlation was found between a
number of models built and persistence scores, the possibility arose that
a>third factor may have interfered with the persistence behaviour of
subjects.

For example, possibly subjects were fatigued after building

many models and therefore didn't persist as much as those who built fewer
models.

On the other hand subjects may have been frustrated because they

couldn't complete as many models as they wished to, and therefore persisted more than those who had built more models.

Thus an analysis of

covariance was performed on persistence scores to control for number of
models built.

This analysis confirmed the significance of the main

effect for surveillance F (1,67) = 10.07, £ (.005 (see Table 7 for the
Analysis of Covariance and Table 8 for the adjusted means).
Questionnaire Responses
The scores on each of the four variables within the questionnaire
were collapsed into two groupings for purposes of analysis.

All of the

positive directed scores were placed in one category, and all of the
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TABLE 7

Analysis of Covariance
of Persistence Times
Adjusted for Number of Models Constructed

Source of Variation

Sum of Squares

D.F.

Mean Square

F

Surv
a

98.232

1

98.232

10.07*

TSurv,

15.340

1

15.340

1.572

.027

1

.027

.003

Residual

614.718

64

9.757

Total

728.317

67

18.704

D

Surv x TSurv

a Surv • presence vs. absence of surveillance
b TSurv » human vs. camera surveillance

*£^.005
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TABLE 8

Adjusted Means :
Persistence Times and Models Built

Surv
a

a
b
c
d
e
f

NonSurv,
D

Mean

c

11.824

10.471

11.1475

2.769

5.413

4.091

2.864

5.495

4.180

Surv = human and camera surveillance
NonSurv = human non- and camera non-surveillance
Mean = grand mean
X = mean number of models
Y • mean persistence times (minutes)
Y'» adjusted mean persistence times
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negative directed scores were treated as the other category.

A Chi

square one way analysis of variance for k independent samples
(Siegel, 1956) was applied to the four groups of scores for each of
the variables.

No significant differences were found for any of the

variables (see Table 9 ) .
While this analysis (Chi square) is appropriate for the data
at hand, it wasted a good deal of information (i.e. by collapsing six
categories into two). Thus analyses of variance were carried out on
the original responses to each question by assigning numbers (one through
six) to the response categories.

Only one significant effect was found.

Subjects under surveillance rated themselves as being more nervous than
subjects not exposed to surveillance, F (1,67) = 4.75, p^.05.
Raw scores on the questionnaire items were then correlated for
all subjects, regardless of experimental conditions, with performance
and persistence scores, by means of a Spearman correlation coefficient
(Siegel, 1956).

None of the questionnaire item responses related

significantly with the main measures of performance and persistence.
Probe Responses
In addition to the major measures of this experiment, each subject
was, before being debriefed, asked what effect his particular condition
had on his performance at the task.

Responses to the question (see

Appendix E for actual responses) were categorized in terms of positive
(e.g. better, faster, more), negative (e.g. bothered, nervous, did less)
or no effect (e.g. no effect, not bothered, no thought) (see Table 10).
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TABLE 9

Number of Subjects in Each Condition Rating Items
in a Positive Direction

HS

HNS.

CS

CNS

Interest

11

14

15

12

52

Enjoyable

14

13

12

11

50

Difficulty

5

6

5

9

25

Nervous.

7

12

8

12
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Note.

a
b
c
d
e
f

Maximum score = 17 (i.e. n

Human surveillance
Human non-surveillance
Camera surveillance
Camera non-surveillance
Scores reflecting "easy"
Scores reflecting "calm"

Total/68

17 in each
condition)
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TABLE 10

Responses Concerning Effect of Condition
on Performance at the Task

;

No Effect

Positive

Negative

Human surveillance

6

6

5

Human non-surveillance

5

12

0

Camera surveillance

12

2

Camera non-surveillance

13

3

V

3
1
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Discussion
As hypothesized, subjects exposed to surveillance during the
task time interacted significantly less with the task materials when
surveillance was removed than subjects not under surveillance initially.
It seemed to make no difference whether the surveillance was in the
form of human or camera surveillance.

Other explanations such as

fatigue, satiation, etc., were not supported since there were no
significant differences in performance of the groups, either in number
of models built or number of pieces of material used.
Evidence that a fatigue or satiation effect could be possible
within the constraints of the experimental situation existed from the
significant negative correlation between number of models built and
time spent persisting with the task materials.

That is, the greater the

number of models an individual built, the less time he tended to persist in
interacting with the task materials.

This led to the possibility that

some other factor may have served as an explanation for the different
persistence times.

Subjects who built more models may have felt satiated

and thus they may have persisted less.

Conversely, subjects who built

fewer models may have felt frustrated or incomplete, hence they may
have persisted more.
ed.

These other possible explanations were not support-

The analysis of covariance of persistence times adjusted for number

of models built confirmed the significance of the surveillance effect.
From the analysis of the questionnaire data it seemed that
subjects in all conditions perceived the task similarly in terms of
interest, enjoyableness and difficulty.

However, from the analysis of

variance of nervousness scores it seemed that surveillance made those

subjects more nervous, hence they apparently had a greater need to
relax.

It is noteworthy that this possible greater need to relax

involved significantly less interaction with the task material.

One

might speculate that this need for relaxation might just as well have
been satisfied by further interaction with the task materials.

At this

point It is apparent that further research is needed to clarify the
relation between surveillance and nervousness, as well as how they
affect persistence at task oriented behaviour.
As reported, all subjects were asked whether their particular
condition (presence or absence of surveillance) had any effect on their
performance at the task.

The data (Appendix E) seems to indicate that

surveillance does not produce an overwhelming negative effect.

In fact

over half of all subjects (36/68) indicated surveillance or lack of it
made no difference on their performance.

A substantial number reported

positive effects (23/68), while a relatively small number of subjects
reported negative effects (9/68).

This suggests several possibilities:

surveillance or lack of surveillance makes no subjective difference to
a task performer, the subject population was not accustomed to thinking
about questioning the presence or absence of surveillance, or the
questions asked may have been unsuccessful in producing candid responses.
Although attribution theory was useful in generating this
research, it seems that no one direction of attribution theory entirely
explains the phenomenon.

For example, the difference in persistence

times of the surveillance and non-surveillance groups seems to be
predicted from the theories of Bern (1965, 1967, 1973), Kelley (1967,
1973) and London and Nisbett (1974).

If a subject's behaviour at

the task aroused evaluative needs, the subject may have sought an
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explanation for that behaviour in terms of external cues.

For subjects

in the surveillance conditions, an external cue was readily available
in the form of the surveillance.

Hence they may have concluded that

their behaviour at the task was a result of the surveillance and that
they had relatively little internal disposition toward performing the
particular task.

For subjects in the non-surveillance conditions, an

external cue was not readily available.

None of the typical external

cues serving to motivate behaviour, such as rewards or threats of
punishment, were obvious in the situation.

Hence non-surveillance

subjects may have concluded that their performance at the task was a
result of some relatively stable internal disposition.

This conclusion

may have led in turn to further interaction with the task materials.
Although such an explanation seems quite plausible, the
difference in persistence times may also be explained in terms of Jones
and Nisbett's (1971) theory.

As they suggested, there Is an inequality

in the amount of task-relevant information available to an actor as
opposed to an observer.

That is, all subjects had much information

concerning their own abilities, their perceived difficulty of the task,
their past successes and failures at the task and, in general, at
other tasks.

The experimenter, whom subjects may have presumed to be

evaluating their performance (and possibly them as persons), obviously
had little of that information.

It is possible that subjects may have

resented this evaluation in terms of some unknown standard without the
taking into account of the information that was salient to them.
Since the salience of evaluation was greater for subjects in
the surveillance conditions (a glance would serve to remind them) those
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subjects may have resented the evaluation to a greater degree.

Some of

this resentment may have been transferred subsequently to the task.
Hence subjects under surveillance persisted less with the task materials
than subjects not under surveillance.
Other theories outside of the context of attribution theories
also seem to account for the phenomenon.

Festinger (1957) stated that

cognitive dissonance may result from"... engaging in an act discrepant
with prior attitudes...'' (p. 261). All subjects may have to some extent
felt that performing at the particular task (tinker toys) was incongruent
with prior attitudes toward the task.

Surveillance may have justified

the incongruity of performance at the task for those subjects.
Hence, once the surveillance was removed, those subjects may have continued to perform in a manner congruent with their prior attitude which
manifested itself in relatively lesser interaction with the task
materials.

With the salient incongruency of performing at the task

uncoupled with any salient justification, subjects in the non-surveillance
conditions could have attempted to reduce their dissonance afterwards.
They may have done this through greater continued interaction with
the task materials to convince themselves that they really liked to
perform at the task.
A cognitive dissonance viewpoint is not entirely viable however.
The auspices of scientific investigation may have lent seriousness and
credibility to performance at the task.

Also, subjects may have

presumed that other subjects performed at the task hence it was acceptable to do so. For these reasons any effect of prior attitudes may have
been discounted.

Nevertheless, since subjects were not questioned
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concerning prior attitudes toward the task, it is not known whether
performance at the task induced any cognitive dissonance.
Finally an explanation of the phenomenon may exist in terms of
the demand characteristics of the experimental situation.

Demand

characteristics may be defined as those cues which convey the experimental
hypothesis to the subject. As Orne (1962) suggested, subjects can be
expected to 'behave in an experimental context in a manner designed
to play the role of a "good subject", or in other words, to validate
the experimental hypothesis' (p. 778). If such cues were present,
subjects in the surveillance conditions may have perceived that they should
not continue to interact with the task materials, and acted accordingly.
Also, subjects in the non-surveillance conditions may have perceived
that they were expected to continue to interact with the task materials
and acted accordingly.

This explanation is not plausible however, since

all subjects were given the same instructions concerning the task, and
subjected to the same procedure differing only in presence or absence
of surveillance.

Furthermore, during the post experimental questioning,

none of the subjects indicated any idea of the real purpose of the
experiment, making it unlikely that demand characteristics accounted
for the difference in persistence times.
Clearly, the connection between a student subject manipulating
a few tinker toy pieces and, for example, an industrial worker performing work units involves a considerable inferential leap.

However, there

are similarities in both situations which may help narrow the gap.
Both this experimental situation and industrial settings involve
constraints which limit the amount of other potentially more attractive

40
pursuits for behaviour.

In fact, since the work materials are the

only manipulable objects present, the choices for the subject or
worker are to (a) not manipulate the work materials or (b) manipulate
the work materials to a greater or lesser extent.
This experiment involved only one trial observation of persistence behaviour.

However, an industrial worker may often find himself

involved in a similar situation (in which his activities are confined
to the work materials) where there are no obvious external constraints.
Obviously important information to him regarding what he should do is
what he did the first time. If a worker manipulates the work materials
to a great extent during the first time that he is free from external
control, then he may self-attribute a preference for interacting in
that manner toward his environment.
The situational constraints of this experiment and of industrial
settings are similar, differing perhaps in expectation of what should be
done during the period of unconstrained activity.

Subjects in this

experiment did not expect to have to continue constructing models whereas
workers are expected to continue completing work units.

Since presence

or absence of surveillance made a significant difference in the tendencies
of subjects to continue to interact with the task materials, perhaps
presence or absence of surveillance would make a difference in the
tendencies of workers to continue completing work units during unconstrained times. Further research is needed to determine whether
this is indeed the case within the context of an Industrial setting.
It must be emphasized that this experiment represents a single
measure of a surveillant-surveillee interaction, with only one particular
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type of surveillance.

Existent patterns of surveillance which may

differ considerably on several dimensions might produce different
effects.

For example the characteristics of the surveillant may be

radically different.

A relatively silent non-interactive type of

surveillance such as this experiment represented may produce radically
different results in terms of persistence than a warm, open, coequal
type of surveillance.

Also, longer term interactions between surveillant

and surveillee may provide quite different effects.

Possibly the

reaction of a person to surveillance in terms of persistence may be
ameliorated over a lengthy period of such interactions.

Further

research might pursue what kinds of Variables strengthen, weaken or
even reverse the surveillance phenomenon.
Of concern is the basic inherent nature of the task.

In this

case the social facilitation phenomenon may be of interest in further
research.

For example, interesting tasks may be complex and relatively

novel in nature, in which case surveillance may hinder performance as
well as persistence.

On the other hand, uninteresting tasks may be

simple in nature in which case surveillance may be useful in facilitating increased performance.

High frequency of surveillance may be

necessary in the case of an uninteresting task, to ensure continued
performance.
Strickland (1958) and later Kruglanski (1970) and Kipnis (1972)
found evidence that the more a supervisor initially monitored the
performance of a worker, the less he tended to trust the continued
output of that worker in the absence of his supervision.

Such

supervisors also chose to monitor such workers more frequently in
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later performance trials than workers whom they had initially not
monitored as frequently.

Lepper and Greene (1975) noted that:

Such self-fulfilling cycles, like 'superstitious'
behavior, are not likely to be discovered by the
participants, who have no reason to be skeptical
of the necessity of a system of overt extrinsic
controls; indeed the mere existence of such
controls bears testimony to their necessity (p. 485).
The results of the present study suggest that surveillance may
be a significant tool in the manipulation of behaviour.

Simply, if one

wishes to undermine another's persistence at a task (providing the task
is inherently interesting and one has the institutional powers to so
observe), all one has to do is explicitly and frequently watch that
person performing the behaviour, then remove the surveillance. On the
other hand, if one wishes to foster intrinsically motivated behaviour, as
indicated by a greater continued interaction with task materials during
unconstrained times, it may be best to simply introduce the task
behaviour and leave the task performer alone.

In therapeutic situations

it may be well to combine surveillance of asocial behaviour with more
subtle suggestions (and lack of explicit surveillance) concerning other
forms of more socially acceptable behaviour.

In industrial settings

it may be of value to utilize less surveillance of employee production.
Finally, in classrooms, especially at the primary and secondary levels
where teacher presence is almost total during the normal day, it may
be beneficial to develop situations in which the teacher removes his/her
surveillance while pupils are busily engaged at some pre-determined
learning or practice task.
Obviously these are oversimplified recommendations and based on
little data.

Further research is needed concerning many aspects of the

surveillance phenomenon.

For example, research might pursue what the

optimal level of surveillance (i.e. Observer-Actor interaction frequency)
is in order to obtain "persistence" effects. Another direction of
interest is whether existing patterns of surveillance can be changed and
whether a decrease in frequency of surveillance would enhance persistence
at tasks.

If this is possible, it would be beneficial to both actor and

observer in reducing the onus of surveillance from both.
If, as Kipnis (1972) has proposed, the mere availability of
institutional powers is virtually sufficient to ensure their use, Lepper
and Greene (1975) speculate that it would not be surprising to find a
prevalence of such self-perpetuating cycles of surveillance-distrustsurveillance in our society.

Further research into the existent

systems of surveillance (therapeutic, industrial, academic and others)
may prove that such surveillance may be a phenomenon that occurs to a
very limited extent.

Indeed, surveillance in terms of the presence of

one who is more versed in aspects of performance of a task and thus able
to help a task performer is necessary and desirable at times. However,
further research within the existing systems of surveillance may also
provide clues to the solution of social problems such as ineffective
therapy, job dissatisfaction and high employee turnover rates, as
well as possibly academic failure and high dropout rates.
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Footnotes
Traditionally a one tailed test is used only when previous
research indicates the direction of an effect. Since no previous
research existed concerning effects of surveillance on persistence,
the significance of the one tailed test (where the use of a two tailed
test was not significant) might indicate spurious results.
2
This was confirmed in the post-experimental interview such that
none of the subjects indicated any recent experience with the task
materials.
3
Social facilitation literature suggested that individuals
performing at a simple task, while in the presence of others, would
perform to a greater extent than individuals performing that task while
working alone. If this had resulted within the present experiment,
other explanations for different persistence times would have been
possible. For example, individuals in surveillance groups could possibly
have persisted less because they were more fatigued or satiated than
individuals in non-surveillance groups.
4
The general procedure was adopted from the procedure developed
for the Rajala and Ross (1973) study. The task and persistence measure
times (20 minutes and 10 minutes respectively) were chosen to best suit
the typical "one hour experiment". This left sufficient time to
introduce the subject to the task, as well as to conduct the postexperimental questioning and debriefing. The number of models (20) on
the list was found to be sufficiently large such that subjects were
highly unlikely to construct all the models within the task time. The
number was also small enough such that subjects would feel that there
existed a possibility of completing all of the models within the task
time.
The experimenter representing human surveillance was a male
graduate student of pleasant appearance, approximately of the same age
group as the subject population.
Concerning the effectiveness of the camera as a surveillance
technique with the subject population, informal feedback suggested that
subjects in the camera surveillance condition were convinced that the
camera was real and that they believed they were being watched during
the task time.
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Setting
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A Experimenter chair
B Television camera (dummy)
C Box of tinker toy pieces
D Table
E List of models
F Subject chair
G Large empty box
H Stand for empty box
I Observation position
J Television monitor
K Television camera, above work area of the table, concealed
behind intercom speaker screen
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APPENDIX B
Sample Questionnaire
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Questionnaire

Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate
rating: for example, ( X ).
somewhat interesting

1.

How interesting did you find the mechanical task?

i.somewhat i_slightly ± slightly ±somewhat ±very

very uninteresting

uninterest- uninterest- interest- intering
ing
ing
esting

interesting

How enjoyable did you find the mechanical task?

L

/
very
enjoyable

3.

4.

somewhat
enjoyable

L

slightly
enjoyable

L

slightly
unenjoyable

somewhat
unenjoyable

very
unenjoyable

Evaluate the mechanical task on the following dimensions:
meaningful

y'

/

i'

1

1

meaningless

unimportant

/'

1

J'

1

1

important

useful

i'

1

>'

1

1

useless

good

/t

/

i

f

1

1

bad

inferior

/'

1

1'

'1

1

superior

How difficult was the task?

± somewhat JL slightly ±-slightly

very
difficult
5.

L

difficult

difficult

easy

JL
somewhat
easy

very
easy

How nervous were you during the experiment?
very
calm

JL

somewhat
calm

± slightly ±slightly JL somewhat
calm

nervous

nervous

very
nervous
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Raw Data
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Data Abbreviation Code

H.S.

human surveillance

H.N.S.

human non-surveillance

C.S.

camera surveillance

C.N.S.

camera non-surveillance

MOD

number of models

PCS

number of pieces

PERSIS

persistence/10 minutes

INT

interest

ENJ

enjoyableness

DIFF

difficulty

NERV

nervousness

MEAN

meaningfulness

IMP

importance

USE

usefulness

GOOD

goodness

SUPERIOR

superiority

+

indicates positive, e.g. +3: very interesting
indicates negative, e.g. -3: very difficult

CONDITION H.S.

MOD

PCS

PERSIS

INT

ENJ

10
11
16
12
8
14
13
15
11
13
17
7
12
19
9
15
19

80
71
204
153
96
116
141
175
138
156
158
40
85
141
116
183
144

.05
.05
.05
.08
.47
.51
.51

+1
+3
-1
+2
+1
+2
+2
+1
+2
+2
+3
-2
-1
-1
-1
-1
+3

+1
+3
+2
+1
+1
+2
-1
+2
+1
-1
+2
+1
+1
+1
-1
+1
+3

X

X

13

129.24

S2

s2

3.55

43.62

1.14
2.08
2.16
2.88
4.28
4.34
4.55
4.91
5.35
9.48

X
2.52

s2
2.64

DIFF

-1
-3
-1
-1
+1
-2
+1
+2
-1
-2
+1
-2
-2
-1
-2
+2
-2

NERV

+3
+1
-2
+2
-1
-2
-2
-1
+2
-3
-3
-1
-1
+2
+2
+2
-1

MEAN

+1
+3
+2
-2
-1
+1
+1
-3
+1
-2
-1
-3
-1
-1
-2
-3
+2

IMP

-2
+3
+1
-2
-1
+1
+1
-3
+1
+2
+1
.+1
-1
-2
+3
-2
+2

USE

+1
+3
+2
+1
-1
+1
+1
+2
-1
-2
+1
+1
-1
+1
-3
-2
+2

GOOD

+1
+3
+1
+3
+1
+3
+2
+2
+1
-2
+1
+1
-1
-2
-3
-1
+2

SUPERIOR

-1
+3
+1
-1
-1
+2
+1
-1
+1
-2
-2
-1
-1
-2
+1
-2
+2

vO

CONDITION H.N.S.
MOD

PCS

15
10
9
6
10
13
9
10
13
9
12
10
8
9
16
10
7

145
132
144
100
119
132
87
111
105
73
131
104
86
77
132
142
93

.03
.52
.64
3.68
4.00
4.20
4.59
4.80
4.99
5.23
5.60
6.48
7.29
9.58
9.94
10.00
10.00

112.53
2
S
24.09

5.39
2
S
3.24

10.35
2
S*
2.67

PERSIS

INT

ENJ

-2
+1
+2
-2
+2
+3
-2
+3
+2
+2
+2
+3
+2
+3
+2
+2
+3

+2
+1
+1
+2
+2
+3
-1
+2
+2
-1
-2
-3
+2
+3
+2
+2
+2

DIFF
-1
+2
-1
-1
+2
+2
-2
+1
-1
-1
+2
-2
-2
-2
-1
+1
-2

NERV

MEAN

MP

USE

GOOD

SUPERIOR

+2
+3
+2
+3
+3
+2
+1
+3
-1
-1
-1
+2
-1
-1
+3
+2
+2

+2
+1
+2
+1
+1
+3
-3
+1
+2
+1
+1
-1
+2
+2
+2
-1
-1

-1
-2
+1
-2
-1
+2
-3
+2
+1
+1
-2
+1
+1
+2
+2
-1
-2

-1
-1
-2
-2
-1
+2
-3
-2
+2
+2
+2
-1

+1
-1
+2
+1
+1
+3
+1
-2
+2
+2
+1
+2
+2
+2
+1
+2
+3

+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
+2
+2
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
+1

+2
+2
+2
-1
+2

CONDITION C.S.

MOD

PCS

16
14
12
11
5
16
12
11
5
11
15
11
10
9
9
5
9

182
84
97
84
76
131
137
108
59
135
136
78
133
87
99
93
107

X

X

PERSIS

0
0
0
0
0
.29
1.93
2.64
2.72
3.50
3.53
3.81
4.48
4.83
5.96
8.64
8.97

X

10.65

107.41

3.02

s2

s2

s2

3.50

30.95

2.92

INT

ENJ

DIFF

+2
-2
+2
-3
+1
+1
+1
+2
+3
+2
+2
+1
+3
+2
+2
+2
+2

-1
-2
-2
-3
+2
+1
+1
+2
-2
+2
+1
+2
+2
+1
+2

+3
-1
-1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-1
-2
+3
-3
-1
+2
+2
-1

+1 "
+2

NERV

+3
-3
-1
+2
+1
-1
-1
-1
+2
+2
-2
-1
+2
-1
+2
-1
+1

MEAN

-1
-2
+2
-2
+2
+2
+1
+1
+2
+1
+1
+3
+3
+2
+2
-1
+1

IMP

-1
-2
+1
-2
-1
-2
+1
+1
+1
+1
-2
+3
+1
+1
+1
-1
+1

USE

-2
-2
+2
-1
+1
+1
+1
+2
+2
+1
+2
+3
-1
-1
-2
-1
-2

GOOD

+1
-2
+2
-1
+2
+1
+1
+2
+3
+1
+1
+3
+2
+1
+1
+1
+2

SUPERIOR

+1
-2
+2
-1
+2
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
+2
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1

00

«n

CONDITION C.N.S.
MOD

PCS

PERSIS

INT

ENJ

DIFF

NERV

MEAN

IMP

USE

XX)D

SUPERIOR

-1
+1
+2
+2
-2
-1
+3
+1
+2
-1
+3
+2
-1
-1
-2
-2
+2

+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+1
+3
+1
+3
+2
-2
+3
-1
-2
-1
-1
+2

-3
+3
+2
-2
+2
+2
+3
-3
+1
-1
+3
-1
+2
+1
+1
-2
+1

-3
+2
+1
-2
+2
+1
+3
-1
+1
+1
+3
rl
+3
+1
-1
-2
-1

-3
+2
+1
-2
+3
+1
+3
-2
+1
-2
+3
-1
+3
+2
+1
-2
+2

-1
+3
+2
+1
+2
+1
+3
+1
+2
-1
+3
+1
+2
+1
+1
-2
+3

-1
+2
+1
+1
+2
+1
+3
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
-3
+1

12
12

113
102

0
.20

-2
+2

-1
-2

8
17
17
10
9
11
9
13
3
7
15
8
10
7
12

96
120
105
91
138
142
117
100
77
100
123
71
140
60
98

.76
.94
3.05
3.22
4.67
4.99
5.49
6.17
6.21
8.05
9.46
9.54
9.86
9.87
10.00

+2
-2
+1
+2
+2
+1
+2
+1
-2
-1
+3
+2
+2
-1
+3

+2
+1
+2
+2
-3
-2
+2
+2
-2
+1
+3
+1
+1
-1
+2

X

X

X
10.59

105.47
2

2

s

3.68

23.43

s

5.44

s2
3.64
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APPENDIX D
Post Experimental Questioning Procedure
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Post-Experimental Questioning

Questions to Subject by Experimenter:
"What do you think, this experiment was about?"
"Do you think I might have been looking for something else in this
experiment?"
...(If so) What do you think that that might be?"
Probing of Surveillance Subjects
1.

Camera surveillance
"How did you feel about doing the task?"
"What did you think of the television camera?"
"Do you feel that it had an effect on your working on the task?"

2.

Human surveillance
"How did you feel about doing the task?"
"What did you think of me being present while you were doing the
task?"
"Do you feel that my presence had any effect on your working
at the task?"
Probing of Non-Surveillance Subjects

1.

Camera present, inoperative,
"How did you feel about doing the task?"
"What did you think of the television camera?"
"How did you feel about being left alone to do the task?"

2.

Human surveillance not present
"How did you feel about doing the task?"
"How did you feel about being left alone to do the task?"
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APPENDIX E
Verbal Reports of Effect of
Surveillance or Lack of Surveillance
on Performance

The following question was asked of subjects:
"Do you feel:
(for) human surveillance: my presence
human non-surveillance: being left alone
camera surveillance: the camera's presence
camera non-surveillance: being left alone
had any effect on your working the task?"

The actual responses (see following page) were rated in the light
of being positive, negative or neutral of subjective effect.
Although the rating of the responses was essentially subjective,
very close inter-judge agreement was obtained using the following
key:
positive!

better, more, faster...

negative:

bothered, did less than could have, nervous..

neutral:

no effect, not bothered, no thought...

Actual Responses
H.N.S.
none really

C.S.
none

C.N.S.
no thought

better than if..

nervous, found task
difficult

felt better, able to
think clearer

felt nervous, more
frustrated

felt okay, better
performance

no effect on performance but nervous

none

did well, better than if...

none, didn't bother

felt okay, much better
than if..
felt okay, probably more
than if..
thought did better, complex'
ity rather than quantity
did more, felt better

didn't really affect
performance, wasn't
bothered
did more, felt
being tested
none, no effect

felt good, couldn't
possibly finish all,
took time
better performance

H.S.
no effect
thought more carefully,
wondered i f doing i t
right

none, didn't really
bother
thought speed important
quantity (went for)
very nervous but time
limit had more effect
did more, didn't bother
at all
bothered

none, no effect
better, did best could

did better, more peaceful
nervous, affected most
when built lousy models
put more into it, at first did better
bothered then not
nervous, hurried faster
did more, didn't really
bother

did better, felt better
none, didn't bother

none, not really
a little bothered

didn't bother at all
none

not really

probably did more, more
relaxing

no effect, didn't
bother at all
no effect, noticed
but completely
forgot it
dampened frustrations,
felt pressure of time
not really, didn't
bother
not much effect

no effect, but didn't
think did so well
took my own time,
didn't bother
didn't bother, made
complex models
none
didn't bother at all,
went for quality
none
none

bothered, not as fast
as could

not bothered, but did
less than could have

faster
not really bothered,
none really
none
none, probably
not bothered
not really

none
none, not at all
none
none
none

/
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APPENDIX F
Verbal Debriefing and
Written Feedback

Debriefing
What I am interested in finding out is simply whether the
presence or absence of surveillance has an effect on your working at
the task.

Actually I am not particularly interested in how well you

performed at the task, but rather whether or not you continued to work
at the task after I left the room with your models.

I have four groups

of subjects, or four conditions rather, one in which I am present while
a person works at the task, a second in which I am not present, a
third in which there is a television camera present - which is
incidentally a dummy camera - and a fourth in which there is a television
camera present but not working and not pointed at the table.
What I am looking for basically, is to find out whether
persons persist less at the task after being subjected to surveillance
than persons who were not under surveillance.

That is, I am interest-

ed in whether or not you continued to use the tinker toys after I
left the room with your models.
How I was aware of whether you used them or not was by means
of a (for T.V. surveillance condition: real) camera disguised up
there (experimenter indicated camera) which is connected to a television
in the next room.
table.

This camera only focuses on the work area of the

I had to watch without you knowing or your natural reaction

to continue or not would have been affected.

After I left the room

with your models, the time you spent out of exactly ten minutes was
recorded.

This persistence time will be recorded for all subjects,

and the times for each condition will be compared to see whether
surveillance really does affect persistence at a task.
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Do you understand now what the experiment was about?

(The

experimenter answered any questions from the subject.)
Okay, now to perhaps explain the why of this experiment.

If

surveillance does affect one's persistence at a task, this experiment
could be of importance in areas such as schools, industry, prisons
and perhaps hospitals.

Simply, if you want a person to continue doing

something, and perhaps be more interested in it, do not watch him
while he is doing it.

(The experimenter then expanded further by

examples.)
(Optional, if requested:)
Now, you continued on with the task for

out of ten minutes.

(The experimenter then discussed the implications of the subject's
persistence measure, emphasizing that it need not fit the expected
paradigm.)
Do you have any further questions?
I can show you my other room with the television monitor if
you wish to see it.

(The experimenter then proceeded to do so. Once

within the observation room, the experimenter briefly explained the
procedure once again, then emphasized that the monitor transmitted
no sounds, as well as focused only on the work table: hence providing
subjects with some measure of privacy.)
Okay, I'll have to ask you not to talk to anyone about this
experiment until I have finished because it is important not to have
anyone know anything about it if I am to get valid results.

I will

be mailing a copy of my final results to you when the experiment is
completed.

Thank you for taking part in this experiment.

Feedback
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Wilfrid Laurier University

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. Telephone (5/9) 8S4 1970

Dear Student,
Some time ago you participated in a study concerning "Effects
of Surveillance on Intrinsic Motivation".

As promised, the following

are the overall results of the experiment.
Measures taken were: Performance: number of models, number
of pieces used; Persistence: time spent continuing with the material;
Questionnaire items: interest, enjoyableness, difficulty and
nervousness, and a "filler" question.
Several statistical analyses were applied to the data from
the four conditions which were: human surveillance ( experimenter
present ) , human non-surveillance ( experimenter absent ) , camera
surveillance ( television camera operative ), camera non-surveillance
( camera present but inoperative, pointed away ) .
No significant differences were found between groups in
terms of performance ( models or pieces ) , nor any of the questionnaire
ratings; however, persistence times differed with the non-surveillance
groups persisting more ( almost twice as much ) than the surveillance
groups.

This was found significant at the .001 probability level,

supporting the hypothesis that surveillance affects persistence at
a task.
A more detailed account of the experimental rationale and
results will be available at some future date, through the Wilfrid
Laurier University library.

Thank you for participating.

( M.A. candidate )

